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Abstract: 
Since the mid 1990s, European governance has evolved substantially, particularly in the 
direction of fewer constraints: flexibility, coordination, peer monitoring, and soft law have 
become fashionable themes. The literature on “new modes of governance” (or NMGs) has 
flourished alongside these transformations. But is the existence of “new” instruments of 
governance necessarily synonymous with an innovative way of doing things? Is it really the 
case that NMGs now play a central role in EU policy-making? Are we witnessing the 
emergence of an entirely new system of governance at the European level? In order to 
address these questions, this paper begins by briefly making the point that the concept of 
governance is better suited to describing the way public policy is conducted in the European 
Union, than that of government. It then moves to a discussion of the main trends that are 
identified as NMGs in order to assess to what extent they can properly be described as 
“new”. This is followed by an overview of more traditional forms of EU action, which shows 
that “old” governance has far from disappeared.  
The European system of governance is thus a good example of change in continuity: “old” 
and “new” are not mutually exclusive and this hybrid situation may in part be due to the great 
contiguity that exists between new modes of governance and their forerunners. New modes 
of governance are best analysed as an accentuation of the original features of the system, 
rather than as outright innovations. Both were largely conceived to respond to the same 
need, to provide a framework for interstate cooperation without leading to an unwanted 
degree of centralisation. This is not without analogy with the metaphor of the “marble cake”, 
used over a century ago by Morton Grodzins to describe the coexistence of several varieties 
of federalism in American government. Pure innovations are rare in the world of governance. 
 
Résumé: 
Depuis le milieu des années 1990, la gouvernance européenne a profondément évolué, 
notamment dans le sens d’un abaissement du niveau de contrainte. Des termes comme 
flexibilité, coordination, surveillance par les pairs ou « soft law » sont devenus à la mode. 
Dans la lignée de ces transformations, une littérature florissante sur les nouveaux modes de 
gouvernance (NMG) a émergé. Mais l’existence de « nouveaux » instruments de 
gouvernance est-elle nécessairement synonyme d’innovation ? Les NMG jouent-ils 
réellement un rôle central dans les modes d’action publique de l’UE ? Assiste-t-on vraiment à 
l’émergence d’un nouveau système de gouvernance au niveau européen ? Afin de répondre 
à ces questions, cette contribution revient tout d’abord sur le terme de gouvernance afin 
d’analyser pourquoi il est le plus pertinent pour décrire le fonctionnement du système 
politique de l’UE. Elle propose ensuite une typologie visant à identifier les tendances 
principales sur lesquelles s’appuient les NMG et s’interroge sur la « nouveauté » de leur 
caractère, avant d’analyser les formes plus traditionnelles d’action de l’UE et de montrer 
ainsi que l’« ancienne » gouvernance est loin d’avoir disparue. 
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Le système européen de gouvernance est ainsi un exemple intéressant de changement 
dans la continuité : l’« ancien » et le « nouveau » ne sont pas mutuellement exclusifs et 
l’explication de cette situation hybride est certainement à rechercher dans leur caractère 
contigu. Les NMG sont bien plus le résultat d’accentuation des spécificités du système 
d’origine que de pures innovations. Ces instruments, « anciens » et « nouveaux » ayant tous 
été conçus afin de répondre à un même besoin : offrir un cadre de coopération interétatique 
sans mener pour autant à un degré de centralisation non désiré. Ceci n’est pas sans 
analogie avec la métaphore du « gâteau marbré », évoquée au siècle dernier par Morton 
Grodzins afin de décrire la coexistence de plusieurs variétés de fédéralisme au sein du 
gouvernement américain. Les pures innovations sont rares dans le monde la gouvernance. 
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Change and Continuity in European Governance 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Since those distant days that saw the launching of the European Coal and Steel Community, 
European integration has had its own particular modus operandi, the “Community Method”. 
In spite of fifty years of debate on how to construct Europe, so great is its originality that it is 
still much misunderstood, even by its most zealous supporters. This notwithstanding, today 
the Community Method is widely regarded as being in crisis. Not only do many 
transformations that have followed the Maastricht Treaty depart from the initial model, but the 
former is often presented as “an idea whose time has passed”, to use the words of former 
British Prime Minister John Major, echoed by many British think-tanks (see e.g. Leonard, 
1999), or even as an instrument of “integration by stealth”, in those of Giandomenico Majone 
(2005).  
 
Indeed, since the beginning of the 1990s, European integration seems to have 
entered a new phase. National governments began to show signs of growing impatience with 
what they saw as an unlimited increase in the powers of the EU and therefore of the 
Commission. It is for this reason that recent years have seen an increasing number of 
counterweights to this power. The ‘pillar structure’ of the Maastricht treaty was undoubtedly 
the first expression of this new tendency and institutional counterweights to the Commission 
have multiplied ever since. At the same time, a strong dose of parliamentarianism has been 
injected at the European level. At each Treaty reform, the European Parliament’s financial, 
legislative and supervisory powers have been strengthened. Its increase in power has been 
achieved largely to the detriment of the Commission, which has been forced to accept a 
number of new demands. National governments are much more assertive than they have 
ever been: witness the overt Franco-leadership in the current financial crisis or the theorizing 
of a new “Union method”, in which the Commission is relegated to a back seat, by Chancelor 
Merkel in an address at the College of Europe. 1 
 
The same kind of phenomenon can be observed at the level of policy instruments. 
Since the mid 1990s, European governance has evolved substantially, particularly in the 
direction of fewer constraints: flexibility, coordination, peer monitoring, and soft law have 
become fashionable themes. The literature on new modes of governance (or NMGs) has 
flourished alongside these transformations2. Some authors have referred to a “governance 
turn” in European studies (Kohler-Koch and Rittberger, 2006). The analysis of the nature, 
                                                 
1 See the full text at 
http://www.coleurope.eu/file/content/news/Speeches/Europakolleg%20Brügge%20Mitschrift%20englis
ch.pdf/ 
2 See the literature review in Kohler-Koch and Rittberger (2006); Bähr, Falkner, Treib (2005), Olsen 
(2008), Eberlein, B. and Kerwer, D. (2002), Tömmel, I. and Verdun, A. (eds.) (2009). 
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significance and impact of this “new” governance has indeed created a scholarly movement 
in its own right (with its “stars”, a specific language, quasi-specialised reviews, a 
multiplication of large-scale research programs, etc.). NMGs are defined, more or less 
implicitly, in opposition to the Community Method. Despite occasional doubts regarding their 
legitimacy (Georgakakis and de la Salle, 2008) or their effectiveness (Idema and Kelemen, 
2006), they tend to be viewed as occupying an increasing place in EU policy-making.  
Taken together, these moves reflect a desire to break with the broad delegation of 
powers that is distinctive of the Community method. But is the existence of “new” instruments 
of governance necessarily synonymous with an innovative way of doing things? Is it really 
the case that NMGs now play a central role in EU policy-making? Are we witnessing the 
emergence of an entirely new system of governance at the European level? Our aim in this 
contribution is to answer these questions. To that end, we will begin by briefly making the 
point that the concept of governance is better suited to describing the way public policy is 
conducted in the European Union, than that of government (1). We will then move to a 
discussion of the main trends that are identified as New Modes of Governance (2) in order to 
assess to what extent they can properly be described as “new” (3). This will be followed by 
an overview of more traditional forms of EU action, which will lead us to support the idea that 
“old” governance has far from disappeared (4). In conclusion, we ague that the EU system of 
governance is a good example of change in continuity: “old” and “new” are not mutually 
exclusive but tend to mix in an ever complexifying marble cake. 
 
 
1. The Community Method as a mode of governance 
 
It is difficult to regard the Community Method as the way a would-be “government of 
Europe” would act given the absence of a powerful executive, able to assign clear 
programmatic goals to the Union and to see to it that action is undertaken to reach those 
goals, and able to impose its views on other actors if need be. Despite recurrent complaints 
about the Brussels bureaucracy or the ghost of a “European super state”, the Union lacks 
several of the classical features of the State. True, EU law claims to be supreme over 
conflicting national rules, but the Union is deprived of hierarchical authority over lower levels; 
it lacks any coercive power and is therefore dependent on national authorities to see its 
decisions enforced. The complex balance of power associated with the Community Method 
has clearly impeded the emergence of a strong central government. Although it might be 
somewhat far-fetched to argue that “Europe has made a principle of powerlessness” (Revel, 
2003), there is little doubt that this result was not accidental. The whole system was indeed 
constructed to lock member countries into a virtuous scheme of cooperation in which 
efficiency gains could be made, rather than to create a new, imperial power, to which they 
would be subjected.  
There is therefore some irony in the fact that the Community Method is increasingly 
criticised for its alleged inclination towards intrusive regulation and its lack of flexibility. 
Several of the elements associated with new modes of governance may help us make sense 
of its main features. Thus, using the classification proposed by Oliver Treib, Holger Bähr and 
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Gerda Falkner (2005), one could say that the Community Method is but one of the many 
modes of governance used by the Union. Admittedly, it entails more constraints than other 
methods, since it rests on legally binding and enforceable actions taken according to 
institutionalised procedures in a system characterised by a high dispersion of authority. It 
may lead to a broader variety of outputs than is commonly acknowledged however, as 
decisions adopted according to the Community Method do not necessarily result in the 
adoption of rigid approaches to implementation. Indeed, the use of directives or opt-out 
clauses may result in a fair degree of diversity. Similarly, EU rules may include material or 
procedural regulations (i.e. forcing national governments to notify measures that may hamper 
free movement to the Commission or to other member states before they are adopted). 
Moreover, even though the main decisions are formally adopted by public bodies, EU policy-
making processes may (and often do) provide ample space for private interests; witness the 
important role attributed to social partners in social policy or to industry representatives in 
standardisation procedures. In other words, contrary to widespread opinion (see e.g. Majone 
2007), what is characteristic of the Community Method is the process whereby decisions are 
made, rather than the outcomes of this process. Though processes and outcomes may of 
course be related, the point needs to be made that the Community Method does not 
necessarily lead to a centralisation of authority in the hands of bureaucrats, eager to impose 
an inflexible solution to any problem. Indeed, as has just been suggested, there are many 
examples to the contrary. 
 
In short, whereas the concept of government is characterised by a hierarchical and 
centralised type of authority, the European political system was conceived and has operated 
differently from the very beginning. If one accepts that the defining feature of governance 
consists “in the interaction of a plurality of ‘governing’ actors who are not all state nor even 
public ones” (Leca, 1996, p. 339, our translation), then the Community Method can be 
defined as a mode of governance. What then, is so special about the new modes of 
governance that have appeared lately? 
 
 
2. A tentative typology of new modes of governance 
 
New European governance has multiple faces and many systems of classification have been 
put forward as a result. In this paper however, we focus on four categories of instruments 
which in our view illustrate the variety of ambitions and techniques that have led to the 
development of the governance movement: governance by implication, by delegation, by 
reputation, and by integration. 
 
Governance by implication 
This first type of instruments calls for opening European policymaking to civil society and 
involves an increasingly broad range of actors. The Commission itself proposed such a 
development in its White Paper on governance, citing as a model the extensive consultations 
that were organised between 1998 and 2000 before the adoption of the “Telecoms Package”: 
L. Boussaguet, R. Dehousse, S. Jacquot– Change and Continuity in European Governance 
Les Cahiers européens de Sciences Po. – n° 06/2010 
 
9 
“what is needed is a reinforced culture of consultation and dialogue” (Commission 2001, p. 
16), a strategy which it has followed systematically in areas where its legitimacy to act was 
questioned (Cram, 2011). The willingness of other institutions to foster transnational debate 
on EU policies appears equally strong, the Economic and Social Committee having been 
particularly active on this front (Smismans, 2000).  In recent times, the Commission has 
displayed a keen interest in more innovative forms of dialogue. In the framework of the “Plan 
D”, for instance, launched after the rejection of the draft constitutional treaty by the French 
and Dutch referenda, the Commission supported the organisation of experiments of 
transnational deliberation inspired by direct democracy techniques, such as citizens’ 
conferences or deliberative polls. However, the impact of those participatory devices on 
decision-making is at best questionable and they involve numerous difficulties, be it in terms 
of language, or because the size of the sample required and its diversity make it difficult to 
achieve real deliberation (Boussaguet and Dehousse, 2009). 
 
Governance through delegation 
The second process consists of delegating a number of prerogatives to autonomous 
administrative structures operating at the European level. Although the first Community-level 
agencies were created in the 1970s, their number grew significantly during the 1990s and the 
2000s, in the wake of the single market programme (Majone, 1996). The basic idea behind 
this move was that the development of the EU’s regulatory capacity was necessary to 
reconcile free movement of goods with protection imperatives (in fields such as 
environmental or consumer protection, public health, workers’ health and safety, etc.). This 
led to the setting up of autonomous structures in which expertise could be developed and 
which were vested with (generally limited) organisational powers (data collection, 
establishment of transnational networks, organisation of discussions on best practices, etc), 
as well as (more rarely) the power to make individual decisions, or to issue rules considered 
to be outside the legal reach of agencies. This compromise allowed for the management of a 
number of issues to be Europeanised without fully expelling national administrations from the 
field concerned, since as a rule they are directly associated with the agencies’ activities. 
Despite significant differences in their respective status, most of these structures have 
become or are becoming centres for experience-sharing, socialisation, learning, and 
developing common solutions. These all contribute to the creation of shared representations 
for European and national actors involved in the same policy area. 
 
Governance by reputation 
Although the Maastricht Treaty rules on the convergence for macro-economic policies 
provided a blueprint for governance by reputation, the paradigm was only formalised with the 
launching of the Open Method of Coordination (OMC) by the Lisbon European Council in 
spring 2000. The OMC was in fact the starting point for the theorisation of new modes of 
governance and served as the basis for further conceptualisation of European governance. 
Although the ambitions of the Lisbon Strategy were quite far-reaching, any transfer of 
additional powers to the European level was deliberately avoided. The Open Method of 
Coordination defined on that occasion consists above all in establishing procedural routines 
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– the definition of guidelines and indicators, periodic monitoring of national policies, 
exchange of best practices – intended to promote mutual emulation and learning. Mutual 
emulation rather than Community control mechanisms was seen as the key to success under 
this new strategy. The Commission was relegated to a secondary role and the heads of state 
and government assumed an overall role of guidance and control (Rodriguez, 2002; De la 
Porte and Pochet, 2002; Dehousse, 2004). This strategy reflected a political compromise 
between extending European influence into new political domains and eschewing challenges 
to member state sovereignty, particularly in social matters.   
Since the OMC was systematised in 2000, new coordination processes have developed 
in the social realm (e.g. retirement, social protection and inclusion, health and access to 
long-term care) and in other sectors where it was thought that the EU should primarily play a 
support role (e.g. research and innovation, education, youth, information society).  The term 
OMC thus in fact designates a working method rather than a particular process, since the 
instruments used tend to vary from one area to the other: drawing up of national action plans, 
setting of quantitative objectives, elaboration of individual recommendations.  
Governance by reputation in general, and the OMC in particular, does not lead to the 
definition of common rules, but rather to forms of cognitive and normative harmonisation 
practices, where convergence is sought at the level of problem analysis and of solutions, but 
diversity in national implementation schemes is allowed (Palier, 2000). The cognitive 
dimension is therefore central; emulation and reputation have emerged as drivers, 
supplanting legal requirements, and the networking of national actors is the principal vehicle 
for European public policymaking.   
 
Governance by integration   
Governance by integration, which has especially thrived since the 1990s, aims to manage 
the complexity and multidimensionality of some of the problems for which the EU is 
responsible. It refers to what is most often called “mainstreaming”, “integrated approaches”, 
or “integration principle”. Under this approach, certain policy concerns are injected into a 
broad range of sectoral policy domains instead of being treated as stand-alone areas.  
An early example of this type of governance involves environmental concerns, which are 
addressed systematically in a broad range of Community policies.  The integration principle 
first appeared in the Single European Act of 1986 (article 130 R. 2) and was subsequently 
reaffirmed. A second example is gender mainstreaming, or integration of the gender 
dimension. Article 3.2, which was added under the Treaty of Amsterdam, states that “in all 
the activities referred to in this Article, the Community shall aim to eliminate inequalities, and 
to promote equality, between men and women”. 
Mainstreaming processes have multiplied informally in many domains since the end of 
the 1990s (e.g., handicap, discrimination, urban issues, etc.). They were reinforced by the 
European constitutional project and the Lisbon Treaty, which confirmed this development by 
defining “provisions of general application” to EU policies (Title II of the Treaty on the 
functioning of the European Union, Articles 8 to 13) that stipulate specific “requirements” to 
be taken into account in the definition, management, and implementation of all policies, 
including gender equality, social protection, combating exclusion, environmental protection 
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and sustainable development, consumer protection and animal well-being (Halpern, Jacquot 
et Le Galès, 2008).   
Governance by integration is being put into practice through a variety of tools. Some, like 
Commission inter-service groups, are organisational: they attempt to coordinate affected 
activities and actors. Others are meant to provide decision-makers with analytical tools 
(statistics, indicators, follow-up or impact studies, etc.). Finally, “awareness tools”, such as 
training, or compiling best practices, seek to raise actors’ consciousness about the different 
impact that policies may have on selected social groups, the environment, etc. (Jacquot, 
2010). 
 
The new modes of governance thus employ a wide range of instruments and practices. 
Each of the categories discussed here represents, in its own way and to varying degrees, an 
approach that differs from traditional “government”.  Together they display some key features 
that are traditionally associated with the governance turn: a greater role for private actors, a 
growing polycentricism, or preference given to more limited constraints.  However, one may 
wonder to what extent this actually reflects a radical departure from earlier approaches 
pursued at the EU level. 
 
 
3. New governance or “déjà vu”? 
 
Many interpretations of the evolution in the European political system tend to pit new 
governance against the old, represented by the Community Method, leading to a series of 
dichotomous oppositions: binding vs. non-binding instruments, top-down vs. bottom-up 
approaches, uniformity vs. diversity, rigidity vs. flexibility, closed vs. open processes, 
hierarchical relationships vs. cooperative ones, centralised vs. decentralised policy-making, 
majority rule vs. deliberation, hard law v. soft law, etc.  Yet a closer look reveals that new 
governance and its instruments are not systematically at odds with the traditional Community 
Method. The novelty in this does not in fact signify a fundamental transformation of the 
existing system, but rather an elaboration of certain features inherent to European 
governance and its hybrid, “unidentified” political system, to use Jacques Delors’ now classic 
expression. This section will show that for several of the characteristic traits associated with 
new governance, antecedents can be identified in earlier policy-making.    
 
The shifting public/private border 
As we saw above, new modes of governance have been conducive to strengthening the role 
of private actors in public policy. Openness to civil society has grown, further implicating the 
latter in the European decision-making process through consultation and deliberation, 
whether this be through NGOs already present in Brussels, or civil society as a whole 
(Commission 2001). As a result there is growing pluralism involved in the Commission’s 
relationships with interest groups. 
Whereas in the initial phases of European policymaking, the Commission and affected 
sectors operated within a structured co-management setup, the tendency since the 
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beginning of the 1990s is towards flexibility and diversification, with the Commission seeking 
to increase and multiply its contacts.  
Evolution in the agricultural sector is instructive in this respect (Garzon, 2006). At first, a 
form of agricultural corporatism existed which was modelled on the joint planning 
mechanisms between producers and public powers that were operating in member states at 
the time. The Commission and affected sectors operated within a structured co-management 
setup. This strongly encouraged the formation of a unique transnational committee of 
organisations representing agricultural interests (COPA) that became the Commission’s 
privileged interlocutor on agricultural matters. In exchange for supporting the CAP, this 
committee obtained a quasi-monopolistic consultation position. However, this modus 
operandi was progressively challenged beginning in the mid-1980s, when the Commission 
started to extend its consultations to new interlocutors (i.e., agro-alimentary industry, other 
agricultural confederations, commercial sectors, etc.).  Furthermore, more flexible forms of 
dialogue, such as informal and occasional meetings (seminars, hearings, consultations, etc.) 
were used to complete and/or compete with the traditional consultative committees. To sum 
up, in the past two decades, in the agricultural sector, as in environmental policy, gender 
equality and many other areas, the tendency has been towards flexibility and diversification, 
with the Commission seeking to increase and multiply its contacts. The initial model, based 
on the narrow association of a small number of organised actors, with clear corporatist 
leanings, was gradually replaced by a pluralist pattern of more fluid and flexible consultations 
with a growing number of groups. But that evolution was detected long before the debate on 
NMGs was initiated (Streeck and Schmitter, 1991). Moreover, in some areas the reliance on 
private actors has been even stronger: technical standards have long been drafted by the 
industry, while NGOs are important agents in EU development policy. NMGs therefore 
appear to have simply reinforced a trend that was already well established. 
 
Admittedly, the opening up of the European decision-making process today concerns civil 
society as a whole, not just interest groups. The goal is to reinforce interaction with sub 
national actors and more importantly to directly involve European citizens through extensive 
consultation. European institutions display a clear intention to open discussions up to the 
public, including “lay” people.  But these innovations are mostly of an instrumental nature and 
cannot be depicted as a major departure from past practice. 
 
The accentuation of “institutional polycentrism”  
Another characteristic of new modes of governance has to do with institutional complexity. 
There are multiple loci of power, decision-making and administration involving a large 
number of players, and there are many ways to get stakeholders involved. New governance 
has accentuated the fragmentation of power by including new actors in the institutional 
system and calling on them to play an important role in European policies. The 
“agencification” wave of the last two decades is a good example. The newly established 
regulatory structures undeniably contribute to increasing the complexity of the European 
system. Even though this movement largely coincided with a period of relative weakening of 
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the Commission (Kassim and Menon), a closer look at the actual operation of agencies helps 
us to nuance this picture. 
One thing is clear: none of them can be described as a powerful supranational regulator. 
Some of the early comments on agencification (see e.g. Shapiro, 1997), hypothesized a 
gradual transfer of political resources to agencies by a Commission weakened by national 
governments’ hostility. Yet this scenario does not seem to have materialized. Though the 
legality of agencies is not openly contested, the lack of a strong treaty basis is recurrently 
invoked to explain that their prerogatives are to remain limited. Admittedly, some of the more 
recently established bodies, like the airlines safety agency (EASA) or the chemicals agency 
(ECHA), have been endowed with greater regulatory powers than the earlier ones. But the 
contorted way in which this has been done, and the multiple controls to which those powers 
are subjected, show that it was not intended to grant them a clear hierarchical authority over 
their national counterparts, as is the case for instance in competition policy after the 2003 
reform (Woll, 2009). Moreover, experience has shown that even a strong agency like EASA 
may find it difficult to exercise the whole range of powers it has at its disposal; it is therefore 
best described as a “subsidiarity-based network organisation” (Schout, 2011).  
 
Hybridity is a key attribute of these new regulatory structures, which undoubtedly 
contribute to the compound character of the European executive order described by Johan 
Olsen (2008. Subject to close control by the Commission (particularly when they lack 
financial resources of their own), they are also meant to work in collaboration with national 
administrations and/or agencies, to which they are connected in multiple networks. Their 
management boards, on which all member states are generally represented, are supposed 
to be the real steering bodies. On the whole, therefore, “Regulation by networks” (Dehousse, 
1997) seems to remain a valid descriptor in a majority of cases.  
 
Given this close intertwining of national and EU regulators, it is hardly a surprise to note 
that the role of EU agencies does not appear as clearly distinct from that of the Commission 
or of networks of “sister agencies” to their national interlocutors (Egeberg, Martens and 
Trondal, 2009). Similarly, wherever they have been established, EU agencies appear to 
represent less of a rupture with earlier practices than was perhaps anticipated. Involvement 
of the member states remaining as important as in the past, existing comitology structures 
have retained their central role. In such situations, bargaining among national 
representatives has anything but disappeared (Ghering, 2011). Thus, per se, the 
establishment of new administrative structure, even when endowed with in autonomous 
powers, does not necessarily entail a rupture with the past. They may reinforce existing 
modes of governance instead of inaugurating new ones. 
 
The softening of constraint 
A third characteristic of governance relates to the form of authority and degree of constraint. 
While government is characterised by a hierarchical and centralised authority, governance 
relies more on cooperative mechanisms and a softer exercise of authority.  New governance 
indeed tends rely on softer types of instruments, in particular by developing new types of 
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public policy instruments that are less intrusive than the regulations or directives traditionally 
used in the Community Method. NMGs often rely more on emulation and peer evaluation 
than on formal constraints; they allow different (particularly national) responses to problems. 
In the OMC, for instance, formal constraints are limited and no sanctions are foreseen in the 
event of non compliance. The main goal of this method is the diffusion of common political 
objectives and cognitive principles, rather than a complete harmonisation or the centralised 
implementation of identical policies. 
 
As a result, soft law is said to be on the rise. Thus, a comparison between the 
Commission’s work during the first two years of Barroso’s mandate and the first two years of 
Prodi’s mandate has shown that hard law (directives, regulations, decisions) generally 
declined (down 2.8%), while soft law progressed during the same period (up 18.1%). White 
Papers, Green Papers and Opinions even rose by 90.1% (Kurpas, Gron and Kaczynski, 
2008). Once again however, the novelty is only relative. Soft law has been widely resorted to 
in the past, for instance to codify the Commission’s policy towards State aids (Snyder, 1994; 
Cini, 2001) and forms of diversity have been tolerated in a wide range of areas (Ehlermann, 
1983-4; Sabel and Zeitlin, 2008). Moreover, even in areas where the propensity to resort to 
NMGs has been the strongest, such as in the field of social policy, hard law has far from 
disappeared (Pochet, 2011). 
  
It then appears that the novelty of new modes of governance is only relative, since the 
final analysis suggests that they do not propose a radical departure from the governance 
model that has been operating at the European level from the beginning (see also Tömmel 
and Verdun, 2009). The innovations introduced tend to accentuate some of the “traditional” 
features of EU governance, like polycentrism and complexity, or contribute to trends already 
under way, such as the shift towards a pluralist model of relations with private actors. Where 
differences with past practice exist, they tend to be differences of degree, not of kind. 
Furthermore, if “new” governance is not that “new”, the “old” governance in the form of the 
Community Method has certainly not disappeared, as we shall now see. 
 
 
4. “Staying alive”: the resilience of the Community Method 
 
To complete our inventory of the balance between “old” and “new” governance, we now 
need to assess the current importance of traditional modes of governance in EU policy-
making. Several elements suggest that despite repeated announcements of its imminent 
demise, the Community Method has been more resilient than expected.  
First of all, the volume of “hard law” produced by the European institutions is far from 
declining3. As shown in Graph 1, the number of Commission proposals has remained fairly 
                                                 
3 The data discussed in this section is taken from a large-scale empirical project conducted at Sciences Po in Paris, 
the Observatory of the European Institutions (<http://www.cee.sciences-po.fr/en/publications/oie-
publications.html>). 
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stable after the 2004 enlargement, despite a temporary drop in 2005, which seems due to 
the intense activity of the year before.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A similar picture emerges for legislative production. Every year the Union adopts about 
200 legislative texts (Graph 2). True, there was a sharp decline in 2005, right after the 
enlargement, but this appears to be a by-product of an acceleration registered the previous 
year, with a peak of 230 texts, nearly two-thirds of which were adopted in the four months 
that immediately preceded the arrival of the new members. Obviously, the fear of paralysis 
generated by the enlargement played a major role in that acceleration. Interestingly however, 
after the 2005 decline, legislative output tended to increase, which suggests that the EU 
machinery has reacted better than many observers anticipated. Even more surprisingly, 
decisions have been made increasingly rapidly (Dehousse, Deloche-Gaudez and Duhamel, 
2006, chapter 1). The stability of legislative outputs is quite remarkable even in the social 
policy sector, which was the theatre of many attempts to introduce NMGs.  
L. Boussaguet, R. Dehousse, S. Jacquot– Change and Continuity in European Governance 
Les Cahiers européens de Sciences Po. – n° 06/2010 
 
16 
 
Graph 2:  
Number of Legislative Acts adopted by the Council alone or with the EP (2002-2008) 
(N=1384) 
 
 
 
The same thing can be said for another major source of hard law: the European Courts 
(European Court of Justice and Court of First Instance). The number of rulings by these 
courts has been climbing, which is hardly a surprise since an increased number of member 
countries could be expected to mechanically lead to an increase in litigation. Needless to 
say, those figures say nothing of the normative quality of EU law or of its content (pro-
integration or not). However, the enlargement has clearly not had the crippling effect on the 
Community law-making system that was announced. 
 
Secondly, the resort to voting, a key feature of the Community Method, has remained at 
pre-enlargement levels. This is remarkable as many studies conducted in relation to the 
discussions on institutional reforms in the run-up to the 2004 enlargement stressed that the 
increase in the number of countries was likely to lead to a stalemate in the Council, given the 
high threshold for a qualified majority fixed by the Nice Treaty (see e.g. Tsebelis, 2006). Yet, 
as shown in Graph 3, after a decline observed in the enlargement period, the ratio between 
the number of votes registered and the number of legislative acts taken on a legal basis 
allowing a vote remained pretty stable. According to Hayes-Renshaw, Van Aken and Wallace 
(2006), the average number of votes was 20% over the period 1999-2004. In our data, the 
average figure is 22% over the period 2004-2008, with a 30% peak in 2007. 
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Interestingly, the time period before voting has tended to shorten. Prior to enlargement, it 
took on average almost 475 days after an act was transmitted to the Council for the ministers 
to decide that a vote was to be taken. This time period has now declined to around 450 days, 
which might help to explain the acceleration in legislative procedures. Of course, the 
relatively limited number of votes that took place during this period imposes a great caution 
in the interpretation of this data. Nevertheless, it appears that contrary to many pre-2004 
forecasts, the enlarged Council is not less willing to vote than its predecessors. In broader 
terms, the impact of the 2004 enlargement on the functioning of the European institutions 
appears to be less dramatic than expected (Best, Christiansen and Settembri, 2008). 
 
 
Conclusions: the marble cake of European governance 
 
In a much-discussed article written over half a century ago, Stanley Hoffman (1966) argued 
that despite functionalist expectations to the contrary, states were not withering away and 
should be expected to retain a major role in European affairs. Much the same could be said 
today about the Community Method. Over sixty years after the Treaty of Paris, the first to 
define the basic elements in the limited but strategically important coal and steel sectors, it 
still plays a central role in contemporary EU policy-making, notwithstanding repeated 
declarations about its alleged obsolescence, made by political leaders and students of 
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European integration alike. Year after year, the volume of EU legislation remains remarkably 
stable. Whatever one may think of its political orientations, the European Commission does 
not sit ide, but produces a steady volume of proposals. Although the number of member 
countries has more than doubled in twenty years, the Council does not seem to face greater 
difficulties in making decisions. At all these levels, the latest enlargements do not appear to 
be a major source of difficulty, contrary to expectations. Moreover, the very fact that rulings 
of the Court of Justice can be controversial – as was the case with the Laval and Viking 
cases, dealing with the rights of workers to collective action and the competition between 
national systems of social protection – is a good indicator of the fact that the Court of Justice 
has remained a central actor in EU policy-making – too strong an actor, some would argue 
(Scharpf, 2009). 
 
However, the fact that the Community Method has not disappeared does not mean it has 
remained untransformed. New institutional actors have appeared; the most prominent of 
these being of course the European Parliament, which has acquired essential legislative 
prerogatives and now has a clear policy-making role in many areas. At the bureaucratic level 
too, a large number of more or less autonomous agencies have emerged as key actors in 
their respective spheres of authority. As substantial as they may be, however, these 
innovations can be seen as adjustments to the model rather than as radical alternatives, 
since they are clearly influenced by the same operating codes. Given the weakness of 
partisan politics at the European level, the European Parliament has not become an 
instrument of party government, contrary to what has happened in other political systems. 
Some may deplore it (see e.g. Hix 2008) but consensus remains the basic principle 
underpinning its internal functioning. Similarly, European agencies, with their limited 
regulatory powers, may be seen as adhering to the golden rule of the Community Method: 
avoid any concentration of power at all levels. Remarkably, these two developments, 
responding to idiosyncratic sources, have ended up reinforcing a decentralisation of power 
that is the hallmark of the Community Method. The current impression of weakness often 
given by the Commission should not be equated with a decline of the Community Method.  
 
There is no doubt that the post-1992 period has seen many innovations and a clear 
desire to experiment with new modes of governance. The opposition between old and new 
governance should not be over-emphasised, however. First, several hallmarks of the new 
instruments – flexibility, decentralisation, deliberative policy-making etc. – already featured 
prominently in some EU policies well before the current governance literature started to 
blossom. Secondly, new modes of governance, such as dialogue with civil society, can also 
be used by EU institutions to enhance their influence (Cram, 2011). It has also been shown 
that the modes of action, and even at times the structure of the actors to which the new 
governance literature has directed our attention, such as non-governmental organisations, 
were often influenced by EU policies (Sanchez-Salgado, 2007).  
 
Much of the ambiguity of the current situation stems from the fact that the turn to 
governance has developed largely to enable the EU to step into policy areas in which, for a 
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variety of reasons, the delegation of powers to supranational actors was deemed 
unacceptable – the best example being the famous Open Method of Coordination the aim of 
which was clearly to Europeanise one of the strongholds of modern States: their welfare 
systems. Although the OMC has enthusiastic supporters, a sense of disillusionment has 
been developing over the past years. By definition, a process of cognitive harmonisation 
such as the one set up by the Lisbon European Council requires time before its effects are 
felt. The real problem is the mismatch between the ambitious objective trumpeted in 2000 – 
to transform Europe into “the most dynamic and competitive knowledge-based economy in 
the world” – and the elaborate implementation process that was designed to attain it. But 
judging from the 2010 debate on the “Europe 2020” programme, meant to replace the Lisbon 
strategy, the lesson does not seem to have been learnt. The discussion has focused on the 
objectives, with little attention paid to implementation concerns.  
 
To sum up, one must avoid simplistic oppositions between old and new patterns of 
governance. New modes of governance are best analysed as an accentuation of the original 
features of the system, rather than as outright innovations. Both were largely conceived to 
respond to the same need, to provide a framework for interstate cooperation without leading 
to an unwanted degree of centralisation. Rather than viewing the relationship between old 
and new governance as a tug of war in which one will eventually be called upon to prevail 
over the other, they should be considered as distinct but not clearly antagonistic approaches 
to policy-making at the European level. The EU, like most systems of contemporary 
governance, “normally functions through a mix of co-existing, partly inconsistent 
organisational and normative principles, patterns of participation, behavioural logics, 
standard operating procedures and legitimate resources” (Olsen, 2008, p. 7). EU governance 
is too complex to be captured by simple dichotomies. Rather than thinking in terms of 
alternatives, we should try to analyse how different modes of governance are combined and 
how the mixture changes over time (Tömmel and Verdun, 2009). The hybrid situation 
described in this paper, which belies the dominant view of the evolution of European 
governance, is not without analogy with the metaphor of the “marble cake”, used over a 
century ago by Morton Grodzins (1966) to describe the coexistence of several varieties of 
federalism in American government. Pure innovations are rare in the world of governance. 
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